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THE SEARCH FOR INTENT: AIDS TO STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION IN FLORIDA-AN UPDATE
ROBERT M. RHODES* AND SUSAN SEEREITER**
". . the intention of the law-giver is the law. ''
I. INTRODUCTION
2
Statutory construction is the inevitable consequence of the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine. Primary lawmaking authority in Ameri-
can government is vested in the legislative branch, while the judici-
ary has the duty to interpret laws to further the legislative will.
This latter obligation has compelled the courts to develop tech-
niques to guide their search for the intent of a statute where the
language is unclear.
These techniques, often called aids to construction, may be clas-
sified as either intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic aids confine the
search for statutory meaning to the four corners of the statute. In-
cluded in this category are the familiar canons of construction,
such as ejusdem generis5 and expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
Extrinsic aids, on the other hand, contemplate matters outside the
statute. Included in this class are conditions at the time of the en-
actment, the history of related legislation, administrative construc-
tions, and evidence of legislative intent reflected in the process of
enactment.
This analysis focuses on the last category of extrinsic aids and
includes committee reports, statements of sponsors and other legis-
lators, transcripts of committee hearings and floor debates, and
*Senior Vice-President and General Counsel, Arvida Disney Corp., Miami, Florida. Uni-
versity of California, B.A., 1964, J.D., 1968; Harvard University, M.P.A., 1973.
**Candidate for the degree Juris Doctor, Florida State University College of Law.
1. 4 C. SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN 128 (1939) (quoting Abraham Lincoln's first inau-
gural address).
2. This Article is an update of Rhodes, White, & Goldman, The Search for Intent: Aids
to Statutory Construction in Florida, 6 FLA. ST. UL. Pav. 383 (1978).
3. "Under the well-established doctrine of ejusdem generis, where general words follow
the enumeration of particular classes of persons, the general words will be construed as
applicable only to persons of the same general nature or class as those enumerated, unless
an intention to the contrary is clearly shown." Soverino v. State, 356 So. 2d 269, 273 (Fla.
1978) (citations omitted).
4. "It is ... a general principle of statutory construction that the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of another; expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Thayer v. State, 335
So. 2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976). A computer-assisted search of reported Florida cases dating
from 1978 to 1985 revealed eight instances of statutory construction in which courts applied
the canons of ejusdem generis or exclusio unius.
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legislative journals.5 This Article considers the value of these
materials to judicial interpretation of statutes and explores options
for improving the availability of reliable extrinsic aids in Florida.
The disposition of Florida courts to recognize these materials is
also analyzed.
II. THE PLAIN MEANING RULE
The cardinal rule of interpretation is that "courts will look to legis-
lative history only to resolve ambiguity in the statute."' This prin-
ciple, known as-the-"plain--meaning rule," requires judicial deter-
mination of statutory ambiguity as a prerequisite for judicial
interpretation. If the application of a statute to a particular fact
situation is unambiguous, the courts normally will not apply rules
of construction to question the effect of clear statutory language.
"While legislative intent controls construction of statutes in Flor-
ida .. .that intent is determined primarily from the language of
the statute. . . .The plain meaning of the statutory language is
the first consideration." 7
However, "[p]lain words, like plain people, are not always so
plain as they seem." The question of whether the meaning is
"plain" is often a source of controversy. Litigants whose interests
are advanced by construction will argue that a statute is ambigu-
ous. Conversely, even the most doubtful statutory language will be
"plain" in its meaning to the party whose cause will suffer if the
rules of construction are invoked. Professor Jones' comment on the
precision of statutory drafting is instructive:
"The statutory proposition must be expressed in words, and
words are notoriously inexact and imperfect symbols for the com-
munication of ideas. Even if it be assumed that careful selection
5. For convenience, the terms "extrinsic aids" and "statutory history" as used herein
refer exclusively to this genus of materials, although the terms are commonly regarded as
embracing all matters outside the statute.
A computer-assisted search of reported Florida cases from 1978 to 1985 revealed more
than 300 instances of statutory construction in which courts applied the criterion of "legisla-
tive intent." Of these, approximately 10% used one or more extrinsic aids from enactment
history.
6. Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 879,
882 (Fla. 1983) (citations omitted). "Where ...the resulting law is proper and unambigu-
ous, we need look no further than the statute itself." Id.
7. St. Petersburg Bank and Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Fla. 1982) (cita-
tions omitted).
8. Smith, Explaining Judicial Lawgivers, 11 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 153, 156 (1983) (quoting
Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CALiF. L. REv. 615, 618 (1961)).
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of the statutory language will communicate to later interpreting
judges the same connotations, or general meanings, that the
draftsman had in mind, the infinite number of possible combina-
tions of fact is certain to cause some doubt as to the effect of the
statute in particular cases. Careful and expert draftsmanship may
reduce the incidence of interpretative doubts; it can never make
of statutory interpretation a purely mechanical process.9
However, the determination that no ambiguity is present does
not foreclose construction. Frequently it is still possible to dispute
whether the legislature really meant what it so clearly expressed. 10
In practice, before announcing that the meaning is plain, courts
often examine both the statutory language and the legislative
history.1"
The Florida Supreme Court has consistently affirmed its com-
mitment to the plain meaning rule." Nevertheless, courts cite leg-
islative history even when the wording of the statute is clear. Flor-
ida courts have used extrinsic aids to corroborate their
construction of an "unambiguous" statute,'3 or to construe a stat-
ute "to give effect to the evident legislative intent, regardless of
whether such construction varies from the statute's literal mean-
ing."" This practice comports with the Florida Supreme Court's
mandate: "It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that
9. Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOWA L. Rv. 737, 739 (1940) (footnote
omitted).
10. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this view by quoting Justice Frankfurter's observa-
tion, "The notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also plain, is
merely pernicious oversimplification." FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 625 n.7 (1982) (quot-
ing United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
11. Sneed, The Art of Statutory Interpretation, 62 Tax L. Rav. 665, 686 n.90 (1983).
"When confronted with a statutory interpretation case, my initial response is to ask what
the legislature was trying to do with this statute .... This focuses attention on the purpose
of the statute and reflects a concern for the separation of powers. To fix the purpose firmly
in mind, it is necessary to read the statute carefully and then to examine the relevant legis-
lative history." Id. at 685-86 (footnotes omitted).
12. City of Tampa v. Thatcher Glass Corp., 445 So. 2d 578, 579 (Fla. 1984); Roush v.
State, 413 So. 2d 15, 19 (Fla. 1982); Carson v. Miller, 370 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 1979); Heredia
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Fla. 1978); S.R.G. Corp. v. Department of Reve-
nue, 365 So. 2d 687, 689 (Fla. 1978); First Sarasota Serv. Corp. v. Miller, 450 So. 2d 875, 877
(Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Cobb v. Maldonado, 451 So. 2d 482, 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984).
13. State v. Ross, 447 So. 2d 1380, 1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (although the court found
the statute clear, it added that it was "significant" that there were no express indications
that the legislature intended otherwise); Reino v. State, 352 So. 2d 853, 860-61 (Fla. 1977)
(the statute was "unequivocal" but the court also noted the actions of the legislature expres-
sing its intent); see also Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State, 400 So. 2d 813, 815-17 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1981).
14. Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297, 299 (Fla. 1978) (citations omitted).
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legislative intent is the polestar by which the court must be
guided, and this intent must be given effect even though it may
contradict the strict letter of the statute."'15
Assuming a determination that the statute's language or its ap-
plication is ambiguous, what means will a court employ to discern
legislative intent?
III. EXTRINSIC AIDS: THE ARGUMENTS
Justice Frankfurter once referred to statutory construction as
"alchemy. 1 6 Surely intrinsic aids, with their mystical Latin names,
warrant such a characterization. These canons confine the search
for meaning to the statute itself. In fact, intrinsic aids do not really
represent a search for "meaning" because their selection is out-
come determinative: simply apply the-proper maxim and behold
the legislative intent.17
Unfortunately, legislators and bill-drafters cannot know which
maxim will be applied in the future to determine intended mean-
ing. To be sure,-the -canons do not always destroy the intent of the
legislature. However, it seems illogical to rely on them exclusively
when direct evidence of legislative intent is available. For this rea-
son, modern American courts have increasingly relied upon extrin-
sic aids to statutory interpretation. 8
15. State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820, 824 (Fla. 1981).
16. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 462 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). For a humorous look at the transmutation of a horse into a bird, see Note,
Judicial Humour-Construction of a Statute, 8 CRIM L.Q. 137 (1966).
17. For a vivid discussion of canons of construction being outcome determinative, see
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950). The author lists 28
common canons of construction and their opposites, i.e., "A statute cannot go beyond its
text," but "[t]o effect its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text." Id. (foot-
notes omitted).
18. The extrinsic aids available, their use by the courts, and suggestions for their evalua-
tion are the topic of many current articles. These articles recognize and support the in-
creased use and availability of extrinsic aids tailored to the legislative process of their par-
ticular states. See, e.g., Allison & Hambleton, Research in Texas Legislative History, 47
TEx. B.J. 314 (1984); Divilbiss, The Need for Comprehensive Legislative History in Mis-
souri, 36 J. Mo. B. 520 (1980); Perman, Statutory Interpretation in Culifornia: Individual
Testimony as an Extrinsic Aid, 15 U.S.F.L. REV. 241 (1981); Smith, Legislative Intent: In
Search of the Holy Grail, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 294 (1978); Snyder, Researching Legislative In-
tent, 51 KAN. B.A.J. 93 (1982); Wendt, Researching Illinois Legislative Histories-A Practi-
cal Guide, 1982 S. ILL. U.L.J. 601 (1982); White, Sources of Legislative Intent in California,
3 PAc. L.J. 63 (1972); Comment, Statutory Interpretation-The Need for Improved Legisla-
tive Records in Missouri, 38 Mo. L. REV. 84 (1973); Comment, Evaluating Oregon Legisla-
tive History: Tailoring an Approach to the Legislative Process, 61 OR. L. REV. 421 (1982);
Comment, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in Determining Legislative Intent in California: The
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The twentieth century emphasis is on coming to a specific focus
on a given statute in its full-dimensioned particularity of policy,
rather than emphasizing material or values not immediately con-
nected to that enactment. Courts now seem usually to strive to
grasp the distinctive message of statutory words, taken in their
own context, with reference to the documented process that pro-
duced that particular act, including legislative history deserving
credibility, and policy guides supplied by the legislature's succes-
sive development of the given policy area and related areas.19
Two reasons underlie judicial willingness to consider extrinsic
materials. First, if "legislative intent" is the criterion of decision,
the meaning which the legislators themselves attributed to any
measure during the lawmaking process has evidentiary value. "If
the purpose of construction is the ascertainment of meaning, noth-
ing that is logically relevant should be excluded."20 Second, legisla-
tive history, when available, allows a court to avoid "all the artifici-
alities which make the rules of statutory construction an
impenetrable tangle of waste words. State court opinions are re-
plete with archaic and meaningless maxims which achieve results
but which guarantee neither achievement of legislative policy nor
professional respect. 2 1
The trend toward the increased use of legislative materials has
its critics. One objection reduces "legislative intent" to a legal fic-
tion. There is no such thing, some critics say, as a collective pur-
pose underlying a particular enactment. Different legislators may
have different purposes in mind when they vote.22 Justice Jackson,
in United States v. Public Utilities Commission,23 argued for
interpretation
by analysis of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis of Con-
gress. When we decide from legislative history, including state-
ments of witnesses at hearings, what Congress probably had in
mind, we must put ourselves in the place of a majority of Con-
Need for Standardized Criteria, 12 PAc. L.J. 189 (1980); Comment, Legislative History in
Washington, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 571 (1984); The Use of Legislative History in Con-
struing Pennsylvania Statutes Part 11, Pa. L. J.-Rep., May 25, 1981, at 18, col. 1.
19. J. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 65 (1982).
20. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
541 (1947).
21. Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV.
382, 387 (1950).
22. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930).
23. United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295 (1953).
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gressmen and act according to the impression we think this his-
tory should have made on them. Never having been a Congress-
man, I am handicapped in that weird endeavor. That process
seems to me not interpretation of a statute but creation of a
statute.2
4
The response to this argument is that lawmakers must be pre-
sumed to possess a general understanding of the meaning and legal
effect of their enactments. If legislative history is available which
clearly reveals this understanding, a court which has this informa-
tion before it is more likely to reach a result consistent with the
legislative will.
Of course we use a fiction if we speak of the legislature as if it
were a being of one mind. But so durable a fiction endures be-
cause it has a use validated by experience. This formula reminds
all who deal with a statute that they are operating in a field of
law in which they are not free to define public policy simply ac-
cording to their own judgment.25
On the other hand, if the historical evidence is itself ambiguous,
the solution is for courts to accord it less weight.
Critics also argue that legislatures often enact deliberately vague
statutes, casting upon courts the burden of decisions lawmakers
wish to avoid. Thus, the search for statutory history may produce a
frustrating scenario where judges are "running in circles with the
legislators, looking for something that isn't there. . . . The judges
• . . are passing the buck to the legislature, the same buck origi-
nally passed to the court in the form of unclear words."2
This proposition does not withstand scrutiny. It ignores the lim-
its imposed on judicial decisionmaking by the separation of powers
doctrine. As Professor Horack observed, that doctrine is not abso-
lute: "The necessary legislative effect of many interpretative deci-
sions is so clear that it hardly can be imagined how the court might
discharge its judicial functions without interstitially exercising a
limited legislative function. '2 7 To suggest that the construction of
24. Id. at 319 (Jackson, J., concurring). But see Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943)
(in which Justice Jackson arguably relied on considerable statutory history while professing
otherwise).
25. J. HURST, supra note 19, at 33.
26. Wasby, Legislative Materials as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation: A Caveat, 12 J.
Pus. L. 262, 267 (1963).
27. Horack, supra note 21, at 389.
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a statute involves an element of judicial legislation is one thing; to
suggest that a court should ignore available information that would
minimize this element is quite another. The primary responsibility
for enunciating the policy and purpose of legislation is with the
legislature.2 8
Thus, this criticism ignores a fundamental legislative func-
tion-making public policy choices through statute. Professor
Hurst's comment on the Supreme Court's validation of the Sher-
man Act in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,2 9 illustrates this
point: "Upholding the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme
Court spoke both for the reality and the legitimacy of generaliza-
tion of public policy as an important part of the legislative func-
tion .... "30
If the courts must ignore statutory history and must also avoid
making legislative policy, what remains to guide them? Their per-
sonal predilections? Anachronistic canons of construction? Even
assuming that extrinsic aids are misleading, is there any reason to
believe that adherence to the canons will produce a better result?
Some ambiguity must be expected in statutes. The legislature
cannot foresee every factual situation that may arise, for
"[s]tatutes come out of the past and aim at the future."'3 1 Professor
Hurst suggests that although legislators do not always forecast a
particular situation, "they may well supply sufficient specifications
to provide a discernible frame of reference within which the situa-
tion now presented quite clearly fits. ,32 In any case, deliberate am-
biguity should not be presumed as a basis for rejection of extrinsic
aids.
Commentators have suggested that legislative history is "manu-
factured" in a deceptive fashion. Many statements appearing in
28. Justice Frankfurter once observed: "The vital difference between initiating policy,
often involving a decided break with the past, and merely carrying out a formulated policy,
indicates the relatively narrow limits within which choice is fairly open to courts and the
extent to which interpreting law is inescapably making law." Frankfurter, supra note 20, at
534.
29. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
30. J. HURST, supra note 19, at 36.
31. Frankfurter, supra note 20, at 535.
32. J. HURST, supra note 19, at 35. Professor Hurst gives the example of an 1853 Massa-
chusetts statute prohibiting possession of "any engine, machine, tool, or implement adapted
and designed for cutting through, forcing or breaking open a building, room, vault, safe or
other depository, in order to steal therefrom money or other property." 1853 Mass. Acts
475-76. In 1940 the Massachusetts Supreme Court applied the statute to a defendant
charged with possessing keys to automobile trunk locks of other persons. Commonwealth v.
Tilley, 28 N.E.2d 245 (Mass. 1940).
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the Congressional Record are not offered in debate or are made
merely to establish "legislative intent" consistent with the declar-
ant's wishes.3 3 The response to this criticism is that such abuses
can be checked.
Abuses in the form of manufactured legislative history would be
disturbing if beyond control. But are they? Where the facts as to
the ersatz character of legislative history can be ferreted out by
opposing counsel that material can, of course, be discredited. We
favor enlargement of the sources of legislative interpretation at
the same time that we would eliminate formal rules in the nature
of presumptions. Instead of indulging assumptions we would
weigh all relevant data.
A concomitant of a thorough legislative process at the state
level would be the development of committee reports, hearings
and other documents which constitute "legislative history." It,
thus, would enrich the sources of interpretation of state
statutes.
3 4
An additional criticism is that use of extrinsic aids abrogates a
fundamental legal premise-the citizen is held accountable for his
actions because he is presumed to know the governing law. A citi-
zen, however, should not be punished for violating a committee re-
port or a sponsor's statement during debate.3 '
This objection is persuasive. Were it not for the existence of ade-
quate means to avoid these pitfalls, the courts might be persuaded
33. Nunez, The Nature of Legislative Intent and the Use of Legislative Documents as
Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: A Reexamination, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 128, 133
(1972); cf. Wasby, supra note 26, at 264.
34. Fordham & Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3
VAND. L. REv. 438, 455 (1950).
35. See generally United States v. Korpan, 354 U.S. 271 (1957) (where interpretation of
statutory reference to "so-called 'slot' machines," based upon Senate debate, was deter-
mined to include pinball machines). In a blistering attack on judicial use of legislative his-
tory, one commentator argues:
There was no reason to believe that [the litigant] Korpan was in the visitor's
gallery when Senator So-and-So made his speech. How then was Korpan bound to
know that the speech was part of the law? Is everyone in the United States
charged with knowing every word that is uttered on the floors of Congress? Must
we read all of the Congressional Record every day-and remember it day after
day, year after year, in order to keep out of jail? Is that due process of law?
Stringham, Crystal Gazing: Legislative History in Action, 47 A.B.A. J. 466, 467 (1961).
On another occasion, the Supreme Court regarded use of extrinsic aids as a practical cir-
cumvention of the ex post facto clause: "If a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto
Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the
Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction."
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964) (citation omitted).
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to ignore extrinsic materials. However, when basic rights are at is-
sue, the courts may construe a statute prospectively36 or find it un-
constitutionally vague. 37 The light that statutory history sheds on
legislative meaning need not blind a court to the Constitution.
As application of extrinsic aids to statutory interpretation be-
comes more prevalent in Florida judicial practice, the need for
clearly defined standards for their use becomes more urgent. We
shall now examine the specific aids available in Florida, and con-
sider federal and state court decisions to determine and suggest
appropriate criteria for the use of these aids.
IV. REPORTS OF STANDING COMMITTEES
Standing committee reports are frequently relied on by the
courts to determine legislative intent.3 Committee reports have
been said to be "the most persuasive indicia of Congressional in-
tent.3 9 In Zuber v. Allen,40 the Supreme Court gave virtually con-
clusive weight to a House report that arguably conflicted with a
less "impressive" floor debate. Woodrow Wilson depicted the com-
mittees as "little legislatures,""1 and scholars have equated com-
mittee intention with legislative intention:
The great weight which is attached to the reports of legislative
committees indicates that the federal courts, within certain limits,
have come to accept the "intention" of the committees as the "in-
tention" of Congress. Formal committee reports, in which pro-
spective enactments are explained to the general membership of
the House and Senate, are the most favored of all of the extrinsic
36. Cohen v. Katsaris, 530 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Fla 1982).
37. State v. Wershow, 343 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1977).
38. "The committee is the key workplace of the legislature, as is recognized in the pri-
macy judges give to committee reports as admissible evidence of legislative intent." J.
HURST, supra note 19, at 37. A survey of the most recent decisions shows the reliance courts
place on these records: Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 978 (D.C. 1984) (committee
report); Gentry v. State, 640 S.W.2d 899, 901 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (bill analysis ac-
companying committee report); State v. Turner, 658 P.2d 658, 660-62 (Wash. 1983) (stand-
ing committee analysis and recorded proceeding of committee hearings); see also White,
supra note 18, at 69-71; Smith, supra note 18, at 299-301.
39. Mills v. United States, 713 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
974 (1984) (mem.); see also International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp.,
518 F.2d 913, 921 (9th Cir. 1975), on remand, 449 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Hawaii 1978) ("Com-
mittee reports are indeed entitled to greater weight than less formal indicia of Congressional
intent such as floor debates.").
40. 396 U.S. 168, 186-87 (1969).
41. G. FOLSOM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: RESEARCH FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS 26
(1972) (quoting W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 113 (1913)).
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aids, and there are many decisions in which the courts have been
greatly influenced in their interpretation of doubtful statutory
language by the construction placed upon the respective bills in
the reports of House, Senate, and conference committees.
4 2
The primary justification for attaching great weight to standing
committee reports is explained by one commentator:
The primary function of the committee report is to inform the
house to which the committee reports-to apprise that body of
the substance of the committee's recommendations and its rea-
sons therefor. To the extent that the house passes the provisions
as recommended by the committee, it is considered to have
adopted as its own the views stated in the report."
"Further extension of the use of this aid in the state courts de-
pends only on the development of the standing committee report
in the state legislatures to something more than a mere
recommendation.""
The principal criticism of the use of committee reports as an aid
to construction is that the reports do not represent true legislative
intent since they are generally prepared by only a few legislators
who fully appreciate the substance of the reports. The same argu-
ment has been made about the use of records of committee hear-
ings. Judge Learned Hand's response to these contentions is
instructive:
It is of course true that members who vote upon a bill do not all
know, probably very few of them know, what has taken place in
committee. On the most rigid theory possible we ought to assume
that they accept the words just as the words read, without any
background of amendment or other evidence as to their meaning.
But courts have come to treat the facts more really; they recog-
nize that while members deliberately express their personal posi-
tion upon the general purposes of the legislation, as to the details
of its articulation they accept the work of the committees; so
much they delegate because legislation could not go on in any
other way.4'
Florida courts reflect the national tendency to cite committee re-
42. Jones, supra note 9, at 743 (footnote omitted).
43. G. FoLsoM, supra note 41, at 28.
44. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.06, at 309 (4th ed. 1984).
45. SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
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ports to assess legislative intent.46 Although they are usually cited
to support the reasoning of the court in interpreting a statute, in a
recent decision, the committee legislative history was dispositive.47
Standing legislative committees in Florida prepare a variety of
reports and studies during the bill enactment process. These re-
ports may be generally classified as follows:
A. Full Committee Reports
House Rule 7.16 and Senate Rule 2.15 require standing commit-
tees to report on all matters referred to them. Actually these re-
ports are nothing more than a record of the time, place, and tabu-
lation of voting on the legislation heard by the committee. They
contain no analysis or explanation of legislative intent.
B. Staff Analyses
The staff analysis is the committee report most often relied on
by Florida courts. This analysis is not required by rule, but is ex-
pected to be available when a committee considers a bill. The anal-
ysis can be updated if the bill is amended in committee hearings,
or can serve as the basis for subsequent analysis if the bill is heard
in more than one committee.48 A printed copy of each analysis is
kept in the respective committees, and a copy is filed with the
House Clerk or Senate Secretary when a bill is reported out of
committee. The staff analysis is available to every member when a
bill is considered on the floor of the House or Senate.49 The staff
46. State v. Page, 449 So. 2d 813, 816 (Fla. 1984) (Adkins, J., dissenting) (citing spon-
sor's notes and Senate staff analysis); Novo v. Scott, 438 So. 2d 477, 478-79 (Fla. 3d DCA
1983) (citing staff analyses from both the House and Senate); Childers v. American Auto.
Ass'n, 424 So. 2d 116, 119 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (citing House committee report); Florida
Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State Dep't of Ins., 400 So. 2d 813, 817 n.5 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (citing
Senate staff analysis and EIS, and House committee report); Fields v. Zinman, 394 So. 2d
1133, 1135 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (citing House committee report); Goodson v. State, 392 So.
2d 1335, 1336 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (citing House committee report).
47. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Prough, 463 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). The
court was faced with two possible constructions of the 1980 exclusion of uninsured motorist
coverage from the general antistacking statute. The court quoted the House committee re-
port, and cited the Senate staff analysis and EIS saying, "Our review of the legislative his-
tory of the 1980 amendment requires us to conclude that appellee's argument is correct." Id.
at 1186.
48. Interview with the Honorable Allen Morris, Clerk, Fla. H.R. (Mar. 26, 1985) (tape on
file, Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Morris Interview]; Inter-
view with Fred Breeze, Chief of Staff, Office of the Speaker, Fla. H.R. (Mar. 27, 1985) (tape
on file, Florida State University Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Breeze Interview].
49. Interview with the Honorable Joe Brown, Secretary, Fla. S. (Apr. 8, 1985) (tape on
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analysis format is standardized and is typed directly into the legis-
lative computer.50 The originals of staff analyses are kept in the
committee office with other material relating to a particular bill.
When the committee no longer needs the bill files, usually at the
end of each biennium, the files are sent to the legislative library,
which indexes each file by bill number and title. Bill files are even-
tually sent to the state archives for permanent storage.51 The state
archives files committee papers by committee and year. Copies of
each staff analysis on the computer are usually erased at the end of
the session. 52
The staff analysis is first written after the introduction of the
bill and may include information from several different sources.
The legislative staff member may ask the legislator responsible for
drafting the bill to provide information regarding the bill, includ-
ing its intent. Additionally, depending on the subject matter of the
legislation, the staff member may also discuss the purpose of the
bill with persons potentially affected by the bill or call upon his
own experience with the subject area to identify the basis and ra-
tionale for the legislation. After the committee meeting the analy-
sis is completely rewritten if the bill is made into a committee sub-
stitute; otherwise, any changes are discussed in the amendments
section of the analysis. At the end of the session, staff often update
the analysis to reflect the final form of the legislation; this may
involve a total rewrite of the analysis or only revisions to the
amendments section.
C. Fiscal Notes
In 1976, the legislature enacted chapter 76-276, which requires
the House and the Senate to "consider the economic impact . . .
legislation will have upon the public and upon the agencies of gov-
ernment" prior to enactment of any general or special law.5 3 The
Senate complies with this Act by requiring a fiscal note to appear
as the economic impact statement (EIS) in each staff analysis for
all proposed legislation reported favorably by a standing commit-
file, Florida State University Law Reiiew) [hereinafter cited as Brown Interview].
50. Id.; Breeze Interview, supra note 48.
51. Interview with B. Gene Baker, Director, Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div. of Legis. Li-
brary Servs. (Mar. 22, 1985) (notes on file, Florida State University Law Review) (hereinaf-
ter cited as Baker Interview].
52. Breeze Interview, supra note 48.
53. Ch. 76-276, 1976 Fla. Laws 750, 752 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 11.075 (1983)).
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tee.54 The House requires individual fiscal notes only for bills re-
ferred to the Appropriations or Finance and Taxation commit-
tees;55 the "Economic Impact Statement" that appears in the
House staff analysis is only required by the House's informal pol-
icy and not by chapter 76-276.
Although the House and Senate EIS forms are not identical,
they require essentially the same information. The purpose of the
bill must be set forth, with a description of the present situation
and the intended effect of the legislation. This is followed by a
cost/benefit analysis.5 These are generally updated as necessary as
bills are amended by various committees and are distributed to
legislators on the floor when a bill is considered. A copy of the Sen-
ate EIS or House fiscal note is filed with its bill.
D. Formal Investigative Reports
During the legislative interim, the committee staffs often con-
duct investigations into various matters that result in formal re-
ports. These staff reports may concern examinations of alleged de-
fects in a statute or problems experienced by an agency in its
implementation and enforcement of a statute. The product of
these reports often is specific legislation drafted by the committee
staff in the form of a proposed committee bill. These reports there-
fore reflect the scope of the problem the legislation should address,
possible statutory solutions, and their potential application. They
are available to committee members when they consider the pro-
posed committee bill and are a part of the bill file. Substantive
reports are usually sent to the legislative library, where they are
coded by subject matter and incorporated into the other materials
of the library.57
Sunset and Sundown reports are comparable to formal investiga-
tive reports, except that they review existing legislation as directed
by sections 11.61 and 11.611, Florida Statutes. These reports are
filed with the bill file and often with the legislative library as well.
V. REPORTS OF SPECIAL COMMITTEES
Special committees are frequently created to investigate specific
54. FLA. S. RULE 3.13.
55. FLA. H.R. RULE 7.16.
56. Interview with William Ryan, Staff Director, Fla. H.R., Comm. on Fin. & Tax. (Mar.
28, 1985) (tape on file, Florida State University Law Review).
57. Baker Interview, supra note 51.
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problem areas and propose legislation. These committee reports
are generally extensive, and the courts have found them useful aids
in construing statues enacted pursuant to committee
recommendation.
Reliance on . . . the committee reports can be justified in two
ways. First because of their specialization and the concentration
of their experience, these committees possess a good deal of ex-
pertise in their respective areas. Second, since the legislature es-
tablishes the committees for specific purposes, it is reasonable to
assume that in voting for the bill the legislature accepts the defi-
nition of its purpose promulgated by the committee.6 s
Many states have also established revision commissions to study
and recommend legislation.60 The courts generally treat the reports
and comments of these commissions in the same fashion as reports
of special committees of the legislature.61 Similar treatment is
often accorded reports and notes of national commissions.6 2 The
Florida Supreme Court, for instance, relied upon the notes of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
Sheffield-Briggs Steel Products, Inc. v. Act Concrete Services
Co.6" The action was brought to establish priority of mechanic's
58. "Often, however, much of the state's most important legislation is preceded by inves-
tigations conducted by special or interim legislative committees .... " 2A C. SANDS, supra
note 44, § 48.04, at 301. In Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1134-35 (Fla.
Ist DCA 1979), rev'd on other grounds, Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374
(Fla. 1981), the court cited ENVIRONMENTAL LAND MGT. STUDY COMM., ENVIRONMENTAL LAND
MANAGEMENT: A FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (Dec. 1973) to support its construc-
tion of the Environmental Land and Water Management Act, FLA. STAT. § 380.06 (1983).
This special committee was created by the legislature in the Florida Land and Water Man-
agement Act of 1972, ch. 72-317, § 9, 1972 Fla. Laws 1162. See also Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d
867, 872 (Kan. 1978); Austin v. Lewis, 412 A.2d 457, 459 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980),
rev'd, 427 A.2d 1105 (N.J. 1981); State v. Stanfield, 314 N.W.2d 339, 342-43 & n.9 (Wis.
1982).
59. Comment, Statutory Construction-Legislative Intent-Use of Extrinsic Aids in
Wisconsin, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 660, 663-64.
60. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1985-1986, at
274-75 (1985).
61. "We believe that the Commission's comments on the amended bill are instructive as
to the intent of the legislature." Kelly v. Stratton, 552 F. Supp. 641, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(footnote omitted); see also State v. Rastopsoff, 659 P.2d 630, 639 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983);
Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478, 490 (Me. 1983); Shapiro v. Essex County Bd. of
Chosen Freeholders, 424 A.2d 1203, 1206 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), a/Pd, 453 A.2d
158 (N.J. 1982); Milwaukee County v. Department of Indus., 259 N.W.2d 118, 121-22 (Wis.
1977).
62. Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76 (1951).
63. 63 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1953).
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liens under chapter 84, Florida Statutes.64 The court noted that
the statute was, in all pertinent respects, identical to the Model
Mechanic's Lien Act drafted by the Commissioners:6 5
In ascertaining the legislative intent, courts consider, among other
factors, the history of the Act. State Board of Accountancy v.
Webb, Fla., 51 So. 2d 296. The subject Act had been pub-
lished-along with the Commissioners' . . . notes-for at least
two years prior to its enactment by the Florida Legislature. The
same notes we quote from here were available to the Legislature
when the Act was adopted."
The court then quoted the Commissioners' notes and relied on
them in its holding.67
Special or select committees and commissions in Florida are
much more likely to present specific reports on proposed legisla-
tion than standing committees. Recent decisions indicate courts
rely upon special committee reports of the Florida Legislature as a
valuable aid to discern legislative intent. In Paterson v. Deeb," the
First District Court of Appeal cited the report of the Florida Law
Revision Council to determine that the Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act "imposes definite obligations upon the landlord . . .
which did not exist under the common law."69
VI. REPORTS OF CONFERENCE COMMITTEES
Reports of conference committees are particularly important
where the language differs in the versions of similar legislation
passed by the two houses. This importance springs from the fact
that usually a conference committee recommendation cannot be
amended by either house, but must be either accepted or
rejected. 70
64. Id.
65. Id. at 925.
66. Id. at 926.
67. Id.
68. Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
69. Id. at 1419; see also Lewis v. Judges of the District Court of Appeal, 322 So. 2d 16
(Fla. 1975) (reporter's notes of Fla. Law Revision Council); Department of Revenue v.
American Tel. and Tel. Co., 431 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (after finding the
statute plain, the court addressed the Department of Revenue's arguments by citing A. ENG-
LAND, ENGLAND'S REPORTS TO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: REPORT TO THE HOUSE ON PRO-
POSED CORPORATE TAX LEGISLATION (Nov. 3, 1971) (available at Jt. Legis. Mgt. Comm., Div.
of Legis. Library Servs., the Capitol, Tallahassee, Fla.).
70. See, e.g., FL. S. RuLz 4.5; FLA. H.R. RuLE 6.59.
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The use of conference committee reports outside the federal sys-
tem is limited; however, when such reports are used, they are likely
to receive great weight.7 In Florida, many of the most important
and controversial bills go to conference committees. Often ap-
pointed in the last days of the session, they are informal and re-
sult-oriented, and their reports generally contain only recommen-
dations on resolution of differences, with virtually no explanation
of reasoning.7s
A review of the journals of the Florida Senate and the Florida
House of Representatives reveals that conference committee re-
ports generally take the form of brief letters of transmittal to the
officers of the two houses, recommending specific amendments to
reconcile the differing versions of the legislation. Sometimes a fact
sheet is attached. Little is offered about legislative intent, although
much can be inferred from the adoption of one alternative instead
of another. The Florida courts readily analyze the conference com-
mittee reports to determine legislative intent from the enactment
history of a bill.3 In some instances, comparison summaries are
made among the House, Senate, and conference committee actions,
but they are not systematically retained.74
Perhaps the closest thing to a true conference committee report
in Florida is the "Letter of Intent" signed by the chairmen of the
Senate and House committees responsible for appropriations. This
document is prepared collaboratively by the staffs of these com-
mittees, purportedly as a result of matters resolved by the respec-
tive committees or the appropriations conference committee. It is
usually prepared after adjournment of the legislature. It is not
available to the membership of the legislature when voting on final
passage of the appropriations bill. Nonetheless, it is a potentially
valuable source of information for the courts in determining legis-
71. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes v. United States, 366 U.S. 169 (1961)
(highly persuasive); Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, 352 U.S. 145 (1956)
(highly persuasive); Claim of Maldonado, 683 P.2d 394 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1984) (conference
committee report enlightening), rev'd, 687 P.2d 1 (Hawaii 1984) (conference committee re-
port to another statute cited).
72. Interview with John B. Phelps III, Deputy Clerk, Fla. H.R. (Mar. 26, 1985) (tape on
file, Florida State University Law Review); Morris Interview, supra note 48. See, e.g., FLA.
H.R. JOUR. 1104 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985) (Conference Committee Report on HB 1352); FLA.
S. JoUR. 982 (Reg. Sess. May 30, 1985) (Conference Committee Report on HB 1352).
73. Conference committee actions are an important part of tracing the enactment his-
tory of a bill. See, e.g., State v. Insurance Servs. Office, 434 So. 2d 908, 911 n.5 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983) (approval of a conference committee report indicative of legislative intent).
74. Brown Interview, supra note 49.
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lative intent in state fiscal and administrative matters.7 5
VII. COMMITTEE HEARINGS
The federal courts are willing to consider records of committee
proceedings in construing statutes,76 but other extrinsic aids, such
as committee reports, may carry more evidentiary weight.17 Judi-
cial reliance on committee proceedings has been criticized. Profes-
sor Wasby points out the dangers of resorting to such materials:
Although a hearing transcript does provide some indication of the
intention of some of the committee members, at best it provides
only partial evidence. Hearings may, for example, be held by only
those committee members interested in the passage of the legisla-
tion, or in its defeat. The questioning of witnesses is not unlikely
to be conducted with the aim of eliciting support for the ques-
tioner's position or discrediting the statements of hostile or unfa-
vorable witnesses, and the latter may not be as well represented
as those taking the majority view, because of invitations the com-
mittee has extended to those it already favors.7 8
Nevertheless, a majority of states now record committee hear-
ingS79 and state courts have relied on statements made in hearings
to clarify legislative intent. "[T]estimony of legislators recorded in
the minutes of the committee meetings and other legislative ses-
sions are entitled to consideration as they are statements of public
events."80
75. See, e.g., STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON APPROP. AND FLA. HR COMM. ON APPROP., 1985-
86 GENERAL. APPROPRIATIONS AcT AND SUMMARY STATEMENT OF INTENT (July 1, 1985) (on file
with committees).
76. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
459-61 (1974); International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 518 F.2d at 921-22.
77. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 518 F.2d at 921; 2A C. SANDS, supra note 44, §
48.10. In Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 182-85 (1969), the Supreme Court regarded oral state-
ments by witnesses as more persuasive than written presentations.
78. Washy, supra note 26, at 272.
79. M. FISHER, GUIDE TO STATE LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS (1983).
80. Bishop v. Linkway Stores, Inc., 655 S.W.2d 426, 431 (Ark. 1983) (Hatfield, S.J., dis-
senting) (citation omitted); see also People v. Luciano, 662 P.2d 480, 482 n.5 (Colo. 1983)
(recordings of Senate and House committee hearings); Hayes v. Smith, 480 A.2d 425, 432
n.10 (Conn. 1984) (remarks in committee hearings); Jackson v. City of Kansas City, 680
P.2d 877, 883 (Kan. 1984) (statements in judiciary committee hearing); Wiseman v. Keller,
358 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Neb. 1984) (judiciary committee hearing); Linlee Enters., Inc. v. State,
445 A.2d 1130, 1131 (N.H. 1982) (House committee hearing and subcommittee report);
Dickinson v. Fund for Support of Free Public Schools, 469 A.2d 1, 6 nn.5-6 (N.J. 1983)
(statements made in subcommittee and committee hearings); Sager v. McClenden, 672 P.2d
697, 700 (Or. 1983) (minutes of committee hearings).
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Florida courts follow this trend. In determining that an adminis-
trative code rule was in conflict with a statute, the First District
Court of Appeal said, "[T]he transcript of the legislative commit-
tee hearings . . . clearly indicates that one of the major purposes
of that legislation was to prevent bid shopping by contractors
... ,9" One may assume that judges will exercise reasoned judg-
ment in relying on these materials. The weight attached to com-
mittee proceedings as extrinsic aids should vary with their reliabil-
ity as disclosed by the circumstances of each factual situation.
In Florida, although committee proceedings are almost always
taped, these tapes usually are not transcribed. They are considered
working papers by the legislative staff and exist primarily for inter-
nal use. 82 Some committees forward their tapes to the legislative
library with the bill files, from where they are later forwarded to
the state archives; other committees erase the tapes for reuse or
retain them indefinitely. Thus, the researcher interested in Florida
legislative committee proceedings must determine: (1) whether the
proceeding was taped, (2) if so, whether the tape still exists, and
(3) if so, where it is located. In many cases, the difficulties associ-
ated with making these determinations discourage their use as ex-
trinsic aids.
VIII. FLOOR DEBATES
Courts have refused to consider statements made during floor
debate as evidence of legislative intent for various reasons.83 Some
legislators may not have been present during floor debate. Often
what is said in debate is for the benefit of constituents only and
may be regarded by courts as self-serving. Furthermore, supporters
of a controversial measure may fear that too much explanation and
discussion will cause its defeat, and thus they attempt to minimize
debate. At the federal level, members of Congress have been free
to amend their remarks before publication, so the record may not
accurately reflect the proceedings.
81. E. M. Watkins & Co. v. Board of Regents, 414 So. 2d 583, 587 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982);
see also Baxley v. State, 411 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981) (dissent citing transcript
of Senate committee hearing as indication of intent).
82. Morris Interview, supra note 48; Brown Interview, supra note 49.
83. See, e.g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969); 2A C. SANDS, supra note 44, §
48.13. Arguments against use of statements made in floor debates based upon the probable
absence of some legislators are advanced by Stringham, supra note 35, at 470. The problem
presented by the opportunity which legislators have to amend their remarks prior to publi-
cation of the Congressional Record is noted in Wasby, supra note 26, at 264; Stringham,
supra note 35, at 469-70.
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The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Peckham, stated:
[I]t is impossible to determine with certainty what construction
was put upon an act by the members of a legislative body that
passed it by resorting to the speeches of individual members
thereof. Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those
who did; and those who spoke might differ from each other
84
Professor Nunez warns that those opposed to a bill may attempt
to place their own construction of the measure in the record in
order to influence subsequent judicial construction.8 5 He also
points out that the process of enactment is lengthy and compli-
cated. A bill passes through committees, public hearings, and floor
debates in one house of a bicameral legislature, only to begin a
similar journey in the other. Thus, the "intent" expressed during a
debate at one point in the process may not be the intent at all
when the vote is taken.86
These arguments deserve response. The choice is not between a
rule of absolute exclusion and one that would establish legislative
intent solely by reference to floor debate. To permit courts to re-
sort to such statements is not to compel them to do so. Proper
techniques for dealing with ambiguous statutory history also apply
to floor debates. If, from a consideration of all relevant materials,
the court concludes that statements made during debate are not
determinative, or that they confuse rather than clarify, they should
be given less consideration. In his article on extrinsic aids in fed-
eral courts, Professor Jones explains:
It would seem that the factors mentioned should be regarded as
going to the probative value of the debates in particular cases,
and not to their general admissibility. A judge is certainly not
bound to accept the construction put upon a statute by a legisla-
tor who may have been speaking only for himself, but as a judge
he will surely have had sufficient experience in weighing evidence
to enable him to make an accurate estimate of the degree to
which a statement made during debate reflects the general under-
standing of the legislative body as a whole.
The discovered circumstance that no objection was taken to the
construction placed upon a bill by a speaker in debate would be
84. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897).
85. Nunez, supra note 33, at 133.
86. Id. at 134.
1985]
504 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:485
at least some evidence that the speaker's understanding of its
meaning was shared by the other members. If, moreover, a com-
parison of the several speeches made in debate on a measure indi-
cates that each speaker was of the same belief as to the meaning
or legal effect of the statute, that concordance would be highly
persuasive evidence of a prevailing legislative judgment. The flat
exclusionary rule, barring any introduction of the records of de-
bate, would withhold from the consideration of the judges evi-
dence of "intention" which might be of great assistance in diffi-
cult cases, particularly when the other legislative sources are
silent or conflicting.8 7
Decisions in the federal courts since 1950 reveal an increasing
relaxation of the rule excluding reliance on legislative debates. Ex-
planatory statements by the sponsor of a bill have been consid-
ered88 as well as those of a member in charge of presenting the bill
to the legislature.89 These remarks are regarded as supplemental
committee reports.90
Debates reflecting a common agreement among legislators of the
meaning of ambiguous language9 and remarks of legislators during
debate which tend to show the evils at which the statute was
aimed have also been admitted.2 Often the courts will vary the
weight attached to floor debates according to the apparent author-
ity of the speaker and other relevant circumstances.9 Statements
made by opponents of a bill have also been considered.9 4 Finally,
courts may refer to floor proceedings to corroborate a result al-
ready reached. 5
Because a majority of states now record legislative debates, 96
87. Jones, supra note 9, at 751-52 (footnote omitted).
88. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1973); National Woodwork Mfrs.
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 624 (1967); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341
U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951).
89. Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427, 437 (1952).
90. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 475 (1921).
91. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1966); Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 650 (1931).
92. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n, 386 U.S. at 624-26; Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522,
526-27 (1954).
93. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); see Note, Trends in
the Use of Extrinsic Aids in Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 586, 588-89 (1950);
cf. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 572-75 (1963).
94. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 582 n.85; United Shoe Workers v. Bedell, 506 F.2d 174, 182 n.50
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
95. Raladam, 283 U.S. at 649-50; United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204,
214 (1923); Jones, supra note 9, at 752.
96. M. FISHER, supra note 79.
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state courts have had the opportunity to consider their probative
value. 7 In Florida, floor debates in both houses are recorded but
rarely transcribed. Tapes are kept in the offices of the House Clerk
and the Senate Secretary. Although tapes are still considered in-
formal working tools, their value as a source of legislative intent is
increasing. As legislators become more aware of the importance of
extrinsic aids, members request that statements of intent be read
into the record or initiate debate so the purpose of the legislation
will be addressed on the floor and thus included in the record. 8
Neither house has a formal policy on retention of tapes, although
current practice is to retain them indefinitely pending the develop-
ment of such a policy. Both houses maintain a cooperative attitude
toward supplying copies of tapes of floor debates to interested per-
sons, and a high-speed tape copying machine is available to facili-
tate this service.
The proceedings in the House and Senate are also videotaped
from gavel to gavel by Florida Public Broadcasting. The tapes are
edited into a one-hour daily program covering floor debate and
committee hearings on major legislation. The videotapes are re-
cycled, but the edited programs are archived and copies are availa-
ble with the written permission of House and Senate leaders. The
videotape medium with its record of words, actions, and demeanor,
overcomes many of the evidentiary objections to recordings of de-
bate and committee hearings.9
IX. JOURNALS
American courts uniformly utilize legislative journals to track
changes in a bill as it proceeds through the enactment process. ' °
Florida decisions are in harmony with other jurisdictions. Many
97.
The evidentiary value attached to a sponsor's statements during floor debate on
a bill derives from the weight which other legislators will attach to these state-
ments. The theory is that other legislators will generally regard the sponsor's
statements as knowledgeable with regard to the nature and effect of the bill, so
that these statements will reflect to some degree the subsequent legislative intent.
Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 525 P.2d 12, 16 n.14 (Alaska 1974) (citation omitted).
See also Franco v. District Court, 641 P.2d 922, 927-29 (Colo. 1982); Spence v. Terry, 340
N.W.2d 884, 887 (Neb. 1983).
98. See, e.g., FLA. H.R. JouR. 286 (Reg. Sess. 1984) (statement of intent on Fla. CS for
CS for HB 1187 (1984)); FLA. S. JouR. 420 (Reg. Sess. 1984) (statement of intent on Fla. CS
for CS for HB 1187 (1984)).
99. Morris Interview, supra note 48. Dr. Morris noted that a transcript might tell what
was said, but that a videotape would show how it was said as well.
100. 2A C. SANDS, supra note 44, § 48.18, at 341.
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cases cite the legislative history of a statute through the House,
Senate, and conference committees as reported in the House and
Senate journals. Their value as evidence was confirmed by the
Florida Supreme Court in State v. Kaufman:1' 1 "This Court has
held that the legislative journals are the only evidence superior in
dignity to recorded acts and that acts can only be impeached by
showing a clear constitutional violation on the face of the
journals. 10 2
In State v. Insurance Services Office,10 3 the First District Court
of Appeal decided whether an administrative rule prohibiting use
of sex, marital status, and scholastic achievement as factors in auto
insurance rating conflicted with section 626.9541, Florida Statutes,
and was therefore invalid. The court traced the history of the stat-
ute through the House and Senate journals and found the legisla-
ture expressly considered, but rejected an amendment to prohibit
the use of these factors as unfairly discriminatory. "This provides
strong evidence that the legislature did not intend . . . to com-
pletely prohibit use of these factors."114
Where the full legislature adopts language expressed in an
amendment to the original bill, the courts consider this persuasive
evidence that the original language and its connotation were re-
jected. Conversely, rejection of a proposed amendment strongly
suggests that the language or amendment is inconsistent with the
legislative will. Professor Sands, however, adds a note of caution. 10
An amendment may be adopted because it clarifies, rather than
changes, the intended meaning. On the other hand, the amend-
ment may be rejected because the bill as originally written better
expressed legislative intent.
The disposition of an amendment is not necessarily an unequiv-
ocal indicator that only the language ultimately enacted comports
with the legislative will. Nevertheless, the use of journals is re-
garded as reliable in the vast majority of cases. This view will un-
doubtedly persist.
X. POSTENACTMENT STATEMENTS
Statements of legislators subsequent to the enactment of a stat-
101. State v. Kaufman, 430 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1983).
102. Id. at 905 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
103. 434 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
104. Id. at 911.
105. 2A C. SANDS, supra note 44, § 48.18, at 341.
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ute are generally disapproved as evidence of legislative intent,
whether by affidavit, oral testimony, or otherwise. In federal
courts, such statements are entitled to little or no weight at all. 06
One federal court explained the rationale in this way:
Such statements are not offered by way of committee report and
are not offered for response- by other members of the law-making
body. The intent which is helpful in interpreting a statute, is the
intent of the legislature and not of one of its members. For pur-
poses of statutory construction, a legislative body can only speak
through a statute, with the words that are used in light of the
circumstances surrounding its enactment. 107
Florida is in accord with the majority view in rejecting posten-
actment statements of legislators. In Security Feed & Seed Co. v.
Lee,' the Florida Supreme Court relied on prior case law in refus-
ing to consider senators' affidavits as legislative intent: "The law
appears settled that such testimony is of doubtful verity if at all
admissible to show what was intended by the Act."' 09 Florida
courts have also quashed subpoenas to legislators and committee
staff seeking discovery of intent in preparing extrinsic aids or pro-
posing legislation." 0
Although postenactment statements continue to be disfavored as
indicia of legislative intent,"' the Florida Supreme Court appeared
106. Numerous decisions reject postenactment statements. E.g., Petry v. Block, 697 F.2d
1169, 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Such statements have no probative weight .. "); Goolsby v.
Blumenthal, 581 F.2d 455, 460 (5th Cir. 1978) ("post-passage remarks of legislators . . .
cannot serve to change the legislative intent") (quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974)).-
107. Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214, 216 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); see United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 282
(1947).
108. 189 So. 869 (Fla. 1939).
109. Id. at 870 (citation omitted). But the inflexible disregard of these statements may
be eroding. See Note, Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: The Use of Legislative
History in Florida 28-30, nn.230-32 and accompanying text (summer 1985) (unpublished
student work on file, Florida State University Law Review).
110. Telephone interview with D. Steven Kahn, Attorney, Fla. S., Office of the President
(Apr. 9, 1985) (notes on file, Florida State University Law Review) (copies of orders grant-
ing motion to quash from the 2d, 17th, and 20th Judicial Circuits on file,-Florida State
University Law Review).
111. See McLellan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 811, 813 (Fla. 4th DCA
1979) (The court describes an affidavit from a member of the legislature at the time the act
was passed as "generally not accepted as admissible evidence to demonstrate legislative in-
tent."); see also Fields v. Zinman, 394 So. 2d 1133, 1135-36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (The court
discusses affidavits from members of the legislature as an indication of intent. "Even so,
subjective intent does not rise to the level of evidence and, in fact, has little probative force
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to depart from this rule in one recent case. In Osterndorf v. Tur-
ner,"' the trial court had admitted an affidavit by a legislator as
evidence of the purpose of a statute requiring five years' residency
for an increased homestead tax exemption. There were no objec-
tions at trial. The appellant contended on appeal that the affidavit
should have been excluded as hearsay. The Fifth District Court of
Appeal declined to exclude the affidavit, saying "we will not con-
sider such [an] objection made for the first time on appeal."'1 3
The supreme court reviewed the case, found an insufficient pur-
pose in the residency discrimination for the exemption, and admit-
ted the affidavit, without comment, as an expression of legislative
intent. 14 Thus, the uncertain status of postenactment statements
further demonstrates the need to identify and preserve other
sources for determining legislative intent.
XI. METHODS OF PRESENTATION
Authorities disagree on the proper method of presenting statu-
tory history to the courts. One view holds that the attorney must
present extrinsic data in the trial court to preserve the record be-
cause an appellate court cannot be compelled to consider matters
outside the record. On the other hand, courts often consider other
judicially noticeable facts for the first time on appeal, and a rigid
rule in the case of statutory history seems harsh. Moreover, techni-
cal rules of evidence may inhibit their presentation at trial." 5 To
add a margin of safety, the lawyer is probably well advised to at-
tempt the introduction of statutory history in the lower court. Any
difficulties encountered will then be preserved for appeal."16
in the absence of ambiguity or conflict ... in this statute."); Department of Revenue v.
Markham, 381 So. 2d 1101, 1108-09 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (The trial court admitted an affida-
vit from the author of the statute not as evidence of legislative intent but as evidence con-
cerning the evils sought to be remedied. The appellate court concluded it was given minimal
weight and did not warrant reversal for the trial court's failure to exclude the affidavit.),
rev'd, 396 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981).
112. 411 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev'd, 426 So. 2d 539 (1982).
113. Id. at 334 n.4.
114. Osterndorf v. Turner, 426 So. 2d 539, 545 (Fla. 1982).
115. The primary problem is the requirement of authentication. Stringham argued that
extrinsic aids should be regarded as hearsay. Stringham, supra note 35, at 469-70. However,
no case has been discovered in which the authenticity or the verity of extrinsic aids offered
by a party was in dispute.
116. See H. READ, J. MACDONALD, J. FORDHAM & W. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION
946 (4th ed. 1982).
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XII. RECOMMENDED JUDICIAL CRITERIA
When historical materials are available, the courts can be ex-
pected to rely on them in construing statutes for three reasons.
First, the Florida decisions indicate a judicial willingness to rely on
materials outside the statute. Second, the overwhelming weight of
national authority approves the use of extrinsic aids. Third, statu-
tory history can be a valuable tool in construing an ambiguous pro-
vision and confirming a result reached through other means, even
where the language is clear. As Justice Murphy once remarked:
"[W]ords are inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is
wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative
history no matter how 'clear the words may appear on 'superficial
examination.' "117
There may be problems in determining how much weight to ac-
cord particular legislative history, but it is not assured that "courts
can ever do more than bring their generally critical faculties to
bear on the totality of evidence in the legislative record in the
same way that they deal with other kinds of complex evidentiary
records." 1 8 Also, there is the potential for judicial abuse by selec-
tive reliance on the sources which will support a desired result.
However, such factors already inhere in the judicial process. Mak-
ing the totality of enactment history available to Florida courts
would allow them to be more discerning and critical in their appli-
cation, and lessen the chance that a decision would turn on a scrap
of extrinsic evidence." 9
Case law and scholarly commentary suggest that four criteria are
significant to courts in determining whether to consider and, if so,
the weight to be given extrinsic aids. We recommend these stan-
dards for consideration and application by the courts:
(1) Contemporaneity: Materials developed before and during
the process of consideration are given greater weight than later ef-
forts to explain the intended meaning. In addition, the greater the
time between the development of the extrinsic aid and the legisla-
tive action, the less persuasive the aid.
117. Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943) (citations omitted).
118. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IowA L. REv. 195, 214 (1983).
119. A scrap of highly questionable evidence was used in one case to discern legislative
intent. The court said: "It hardly needs mentioning that 'in Maryland there usually is little
prepassage evidence of intent.' However, with this particular bill we are provided with a
note contained in the files of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, author unknown."
Director of Fin. v. Cole, 465 A.2d 450, 460 (Md. 1983) (citation omitted).
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(2) Credibility: The more explanatory, analytical, and less con-
trived the extrinsic aid, the greater the weight it will be accorded.
Therefore, reports of committees are generally regarded with re-
spect by the courts. Floor debates, on the other hand, have been
excluded as too unreliable in many jurisdictions.
(3) Proximity: The closer the source of the aid to the essence of
legislative action, the more persuasive the aid is to the courts. For
instance, a substantive report by a conference committee would
probably be given greater weight than a conflicting report by a
standing committee. Likewise, remarks by a committee chairman,
floor manager, or sponsor of a bill are regarded as more persuasive
than statements by other legislators.
(4) Context: The weight given a particular aid will vary de-
pending on other factors in the legislative history of the statute,
such as consensus and availability. Was the member's remark or
explanation accepted or opposed by others? How closely does the
enacted bill conform to the recommendation of the committee
whose report is offered as evidence of legislative intent? How likely
is it that legislators were aware of the existence of the aid?
These criteria and standards overlap. Nevertheless, they should
be considered in relation to one another. The entire context must
determine the final, cumulative weight to be given any particular
extrinsic aid. As Justice Frankfurter once remarked:
Unhappily, there is no table of logarithms for statutory con-
struction. No item of evidence has a fixed or even average weight.
One or another may be decisive in one set of circumstances, while
of little value elsewhere. A painstaking, detailed report by a Sen-
ate Committee bearing directly on the immediate question may
settle the matter. A loose statement even by a chairman of a com-
mittee, made impromptu in the heat of debate, less informing in
cold type than when heard on the floor, will hardly be accorded
the weight of an encyclical.20
XIII. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE
Florida courts are favorably disposed to consider extrinsic aids
in determining legislative intent. However, use of these aids is still
difficult, not because of judicial reservation, but because there is no
systematic method by which materials are developed, collected,
120. Frankfurter, supra note 20, at 543.
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and retained. Some of the recommendations made seven years ago
have been informally adopted or implemented by custom, but the
need for a comprehensive official policy to retain materials indicat-
ing legislative history is more critical than ever. Therefore, our rec-
ommendations address procedural improvements in legislative
management and development of specific aids. The following rec-
ommendations primarily address procedural matters, most of
which can be implemented without additional legislation or any
significant increase in cost. If implemented, these recommenda-
tions would provide a simple, systematic means of locating and
documenting materials which bear significantly on legislative
intent.
(1) The most immediate need is to identify or select a single or
central repository for legislative intent materials. These materials
presently are kept by the Clerk of the House of Representatives,
the Secretary of the Senate, the legislative library, the various
House and Senate committees, and the Secretary of State. This
responsibility should be vested in the Department of State, which
already is the principal agency responsible for records management
and for maintaining at the state archives many documents bearing
on legislative intent. This recommendation would not infringe on
the responsibility of the Clerk and Secretary to administer the leg-
islative process, the legislative library to provide an information
resource to the legislature, or the committees to consider legisla-
tion and make recommendations to their respective houses.
(2) For each legislative biennium, the Secretary and the Clerk
should maintain a master file on each bill, into which would be
placed all appropriate materials relating to the legislation. At the
end of the biennium, these officers would transmit the files to the
Department of State for retention in the state archives. The files
should be merged, and duplicative materials discarded by Depart-
ment of State archivists. The files relating to unsuccessful legisla-
tion should then be disposed of in a fashion consistent with state
records management policy. Files on enacted bills should be re-
tained for a period determined by the Department of State-a pe-
riod of at least ten years. The legislature is also considering the
feasibility of developing a central computerized data base for stor-
ing documents prepared in the enactment process. 21 This would
provide centralized storage of staff analyses, bill drafts, and docu-
ments prepared for enactment, increasing the probability of a com-
121. Breeze Interview, supra note 48.
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plete document record being retained.
(3) Another important need is to develop a uniform formal
policy on the retention of relevant materials. A systematic method
for forwarding all materials to the master file and central reposi-
tory should be established. Presently, various materials are re-
tained for differing lengths of time and are archived on an ad hoc
basis. A uniform formal policy applicable to both houses would fa-
cilitate use of materials.
(4) Each general bill which is introduced should be accompa-
nied by a sponsor's statement of explanation and intent. The for-
mat of such a statement should be prescribed by legislative rule.
At the least, these statements should provide a general overview of
the purpose of the legislation. This general statement should be
supplemented with a brief explanation of purpose and intent for
each section or other major subdivision of the bill.
One approach for which the procedural framework already exists
is the staff analysis, which has been discussed previously. Sponsors
could submit statements to committee staff to be incorporated into
the bill analysis. Another format would require an inclusion of in-
tent in the bill itself.12 2 Either procedure would insure the state-
ment of intent would be available to all members during considera-
tion of the bill. To implement this idea, such statements should be
prepared in both houses for all legislation, and the forms and pro-
cedures employed in the House and the Senate should be uniform.
(5) A staff analysis on each bill heard in committee should be
required by rule. A standard format should be adopted by both the
House and the Senate. Of course, more detailed and analytical re-
ports should also be prepared and distributed to the membership,
especially on complex legislation.
(6) Conference committees should prepare and submit more
substantive reports regarding the resolution of differences in legis-
lation and the rationale or intent of those changes.
(7) Committees, legislators, and staff should be required to file
with the Clerk of the House of Representatives or with the Secre-
tary of the Senate a copy of any material which is distributed to
the membership of the respective houses relating to legislation
under consideration. This would include reports, memoranda, fact
sheets, and other such material which seeks to analyze, explain,
122. Many consequential bills have preambles explaining legislative intent. Morris Inter-
view, supra note 48. A computer-assisted search of the data base of the Jt. Legis. Mgt.
Comm., Div. of Statutory Revision revealed 260 references to "legislative intent" in the stat-
utes (printout on file, Florida State University Law Review).
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"sell," or defend legislation. These would be included in the master
file.
(8) All hearings of committees and subcommittees, including
conference committees, should be electronically recorded by com-
mittee staff. The tapes of these hearings should be placed in con-
tainers on which would be marked the date of the hearing and the
bill numbers of legislation considered. These tapes should be main-
tained securely in the committee offices for a period of time deter-
mined by each house to allow for needed in-office reference -per-
haps no more than thirty days. The tapes would then be delivered
to the Secretary or the Clerk, who would maintain them securely
until the end of the legislative biennium. At that time, they would
be forwarded to the Department of State for retention with other
legislative materials.
(9) Recordings of floor debates in each house should be re-
tained by the Secretary and the Clerk for two years after the con-
clusion of the legislative session, then forwarded to the Depart-
ment of State with other materials.
(10) Consideration should be given to a more liberal policy re-
garding insertion of materials (statements or memoranda) in the
Senate and House journals where such material was presented on
the floor contemporaneously with the action discussed and was
available in written form to the members. Because of difficulties in
daily production of the journals, insertion of verbal statements not
delivered from a written text, which would require transcription,
should continue to be disallowed.
(11) Videotapes of the committee and floor debate on major
legislation should be retained by the Clerk and Secretary for the
biennium and then stored with the master file. Standards should
be developed to determine which legislation is "major" for this
purpose.
(12) The annual legislative "letter of intent" should be placed
in the master file of the appropriations act.
To implement recommendations 1 and 2, legislation providing
the necessary authorization for the Department of State should be
enacted. To implement recommendations 3-12, appropriate
amendments should be made to the rules of the Florida Senate
and the Florida House of Representatives.
XIV. CONCLUSION
This Article has examined various extrinsic aids to statutory
construction, suggested criteria for determining their evidentiary
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value, and offered alternative methods for increasing the availabil-
ity of reliable statutory history in Florida. It has also illustrated
judicial willingness to consider all aspects of the enactment process
in construing and applying statutes in accordance with the legisla-
ture's purpose. The debate over the existence of legislative intent
or the efficacy of extrinsic aids is academic-Florida courts are us-
ing them. Legislators should take an active role in preserving and
documenting a record of their purpose in drafting and enacting
legislation. By providing the courts with a panoply of reliable legis-
lative history, the legislature will enable judges to understand and
apply legislative intent, furthering the constitutional mandate for
separation of powers.
Without the ability to consult reliable extrinsic aids, courts must
rely solely on legislative language, aptly described by Professor
Jones as "notoriously inexact and imperfect symbols for the com-
munication of ideas." '12 Moreover, these "imperfect symbols" must
be molded and applied by bill-drafters subject to the pressures and
vagaries of the legislative process. Therefore, it is not surprising
that legislative language often is less than exact. Commenting on
the pitfalls of loose legislative drafting, Justice Frankfurter re-
minded his audience of a cartoon in which one legislator said to his
colleagues, "'I admit this new bill is too complicated to under-
stand. We'll just have to pass it to find out what it means.' "124 The
legislature owes it to the people of Florida to ensure the laws
passed by their representatives are the laws applied by the courts.
Development and preservation of extrinsic aids is the best way to
fulfill that obligation.
123. Jones, supra note 9, at 739 (footnote omitted).
124. Frankfurter, supra note 20, at 545.
